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There is often a curious distinction between what the scientific community and the general population believe 
to be true of dire scientific issues, and this skepticism tends to vary markedly across groups. For instance, in 
the case of climate change, Republicans (conservatives) are especially skeptical of the relevant science, 
particularly when they are compared with Democrats (liberals). What causes such radical group differences? 
We suggest, as have previous accounts, that this phenomenon is often motivated. However, the source of this 
motivation is not necessarily an aversion to the problem, per se, but an aversion to the solutions associated with 
the problem. This difference in underlying process holds important implications for understanding, predicting, 
and influencing motivated skepticism. In 4 studies, we tested this solution aversion explanation for why people 
are often so divided over evidence and why this divide often occurs so saliently across political party lines. 
Studies 1, 2, and 3— using correlational and experimental methodologies— demonstrated that Republicans’ 
increased skepticism toward environmental sciences may be partly attributable to a conflict between specific 
ideological values and the most popularly discussed environmental solutions. Study 4 found that, in a different 
domain (crime), those holding a more liberal ideology (support for gun control) also show skepticism 
motivated by solution aversion. 
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Many serious local, national, and global problems exist today. 
For instance, physical and social scientists have identified envi- 
ronmental problems such as climate change, rising crime rates, and 
emerging health epidemics as requiring immediate, proactive in- 
tervention. However, even in cases in which there is little scientific 
debate, substantial skepticism exists in the general populace, with 
experiments and polling data showing that groups of people vary 
widely in the degree to which they dispute these facts (Pew 
Research Center, 2010; Schuldt, Konrath, & Schwarz, 2011). 
Why do some people, in some domains, appear so especially 
distrustful of conclusions that scientists themselves agree upon? 
Several interesting perspectives have been offered to help explain 
patterns of scientific denial, including heightened sensitivity to 
negative information (Carraro, Castelli, & Macchiella, 2011; Ox- 
ley et al., 2008), dispositional motivated cognition differences 
(Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), and conspiratorial 
mindsets (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013). Without 
disputing  any  of  these  approaches,  we  seek  to  offer  a  novel 
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perspective on denial that can complement this newly burgeoning 
and important psychological literature. 
We propose a motivation behind the denial of many of today’s 
problems that is rooted not in a fear of the general problem, per se, 
but rather in fear of the specific solutions associated with that 
problem. Building on and integrating the growing literatures ad- 
dressing the psychology of ideological motivations (Carney, Jost, 
Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Jost, 2006; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; 
Kahan, 2009; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Tedin, 1987), identity mo- 
tives (Sedikides & Strube, 1997), and motivated cognition (Ditto 
& Lopez, 1992; Kunda, 1990), we propose a solution aversion 
model to explain why people are often so divided over scientific 
evidence about certain problems and why this divide often occurs 
across political party lines (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a, 2011b; 
Pew Research Center, 2010; Schuldt et al., 2011). The solution 
aversion model predicts that certain solutions associated with 
problems  (e.g.,  government  regulation)  are  more  aversive  and 
more threatening to individuals who hold an ideology that is 
incompatible with or even challenged by the solution, and this 
increases skepticism of the problems’ existence. Through three 
experiments, we provide evidence for this model and do so in one 
of the most politically contentious and arguably important prob- 
lems of modern times: environmental degradation and climate 
change. We provide an additional study outside this area to show 
the breadth of the model. 
 
Climate Change and the Environment 
 
In the scientific community, there is a consensus (Cook et al., 
2013; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007; Oreskes, 
2004) that global temperatures will rise over the next century, that
 
  
temperature increases will be consequential, and that humankind is 
largely responsible for climate change (and humankind is also the 
cause of other environment risks, such as lung damage; State of the 
Air, 2013). However, there is a near political party-line divide over 
the veracity of many of the same issues. In the United States, 
Democrats (liberals) tend to agree with the consensus of the 
scientific community on climate change, and Republicans (con- 
servatives) more often hold the belief that temperatures will not 
increase and that humankind is not responsible (McCright & 
Dunlap, 2011a, 2011b; Pew Research Center, 2010; Schuldt et al., 
2011). Researchers, media outlets, bloggers, and politicians pro- 
pose many explanations for this party-line divide. Some propose a 
differential exposure hypothesis, stating that Republicans and 
Democrats differ in exposure to scientific information supporting 
the veracity of climate change, for example, through exposure to 
different media outlets or educational systems (Yam, 2012). Oth- 
ers propose a differential faith in science hypothesis, which posits 
that Republicans simply have less faith in science or are even 
“antiscience” (Cunningham, 2012; Gauchat, 2012). Some other 
research supports the possibility that Republicans’ cognitions are 
more motivated and threatened (Jost et al., 2003) by negative 
information (Carraro et al., 2011; Oxley et al., 2008) than are those 
of Democrats, making Republicans more likely to deny the exis- 
tence of negative issues like climate change or dangerous chemi- 
cals in the air. Finally, many vocal Republicans claim they have 
uniquely evaluated climate change science thoughtfully and have 
rationally concluded it does not exist (Samuelson, 2010). 
Though the general skepticism and political divide over climate 
change cannot be reduced to a single cause, it is clear that strate- 
gies of communication intended to persuade all Americans of the 
scientific consensus around climate change and other environmen- 
tal dangers have failed to successfully address the causal factors. 
Over the past two decades, media vehicles (e.g., An Inconvenient 
Truth) entailing an onslaught of statistics and proposals for serious 
governmental regulatory policies (Gore, 2006) have both domi- 
nated environmental communication and failed to resonate with 
conservatives (Kahan, 2010). The political divide has persisted 
despite such a staggering and often aggressive amount of environ- 
mental communication, which begs the question of what specific 
causal factor or factors can explain the divide and improve envi- 
ronmental communication to reduce the divide. 
 
 
Motivated Skepticism 
 
Logically, one’s belief in the accuracy of a scientific finding 
should be independent of whether the findings and related conse- 
quences are undesirable. Yet, research in motivated reasoning 
shows that psychological motivations often direct reasoning, such 
that judgments of evidence are not independent of desires or 
motivations (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Kunda, 1990). Of importance, 
recent evidence has demonstrated that political ideology (Tedin, 
1987, p. 65, cited by Jost, 2006, p. 653), defined as “an interrelated 
set of moral and political attitudes that possesses cognitive, affec- 
tive, and motivational components,” can similarly guide, funnel, 
and constrain the processing of information and alter behavior 
(Carney et al., 2008; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; Kahan, 2009; 
Taber & Lodge, 2006). Such motivated biases in cognition and 
behavior can occur for those holding conservative or liberal ide- 
ologies, depending on how the circumstances threaten or support 
one’s respective ideologies and intuitions (Ditto & Liu, 2011; 
Haidt, 2013). 
Some researchers have posited that conservatives are disposi- 
tionally more prone to motivated cognition (Jost et al., 2003). 
Some findings suggest in particular that conservatives have a 
greater sensitivity to fearful and negative information that may 
lead to motivational differences in cognition (Carraro et al., 2011; 
Oxley et al., 2008). This would suggest that conservatives are more 
motivated to deny climate change science due to a stronger fear of 
the problem’s negative consequences. In this paper, we do not seek 
to support or refute these findings; that is, our purpose here is not 
to locate something unique to the psychology of conservatives that 
makes them more likely to deny threatening scientific fact or 
something unique to liberals that make them more likely to accept 
it. Instead, we focus on how a basic model of motivated cogni- 
tion— one that should apply to all sorts of people—that can be 
used to shed new light on this particular ideological divide. Thus, 
though a consequence of testing our solution aversion model in the 
context of climate change and the environment is that a good 
portion of our theory and evidence will be directed toward ex- 
plaining conservatives’ relatively low level of acceptance, the 
analysis presented here is not meant to apply to one specific group. 
Indeed, to make this point clear, in our final study we shift the 
context away from the environment and demonstrate that individ- 
uals holding a more liberal ideology will also engage in solution 
aversion. 
 
 
Fear of the Problem or Fear of the Solution? 
 
Public problems often morally mandate policy solutions. Ac- 
cordingly, the call to politicized action tends to closely follow the 
scientific dialogue around any large-scale problem (Gore, 2006; 
see Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, for an example of social science 
problems followed by social science policy recommendations). For 
instance, research on education is often paired with policy solu- 
tions such as heavy teaching requirements, research on human 
irrationality is often coupled with proposals for governmental 
interventions, and climate change research is often tied to propos- 
als that restrict free markets and incur certain proximal costs 
(Babiker & Eckaus, 2002; Koba, 2013). 
We hypothesize that one important consequence of this is that 
the solutions that are often paired with these issues may motivate 
reactions to the science. That is, although it may be tempting to 
assume people’s reactions to reports of potentially severe societal 
threats (e.g., environmental health risks, crime) may be driven 
simply by people’s fear of falling victim to those threats, the reality 
may be more complicated. That is, people may deny problems not 
because of the inherent seriousness of the problems themselves but 
because of the ideological or tangible threat posed by the associ- 
ated policy solutions. 
It has become increasingly clear that political ideologies and 
affiliations are not just objectively adopted beliefs but are deeply 
ingrained  aspects  of  social  identity  (Abramowitz  &  Saunders, 
2006; Greene, 2004; Toner, Leary, Asher, & Jongman-Sereno, 
2013). As with other social-identity processes, ideology can pow- 
erfully motivate perceptual and interpretive processes (Jost, 2006). 
As a result, although certain scientific realities—like climate 
change—may not in and of themselves threaten a specific identity 
or ideology, consistently pairing them with specific policy solu-
  
tions might lead perceivers to act as though they do. This is 
important insofar as it suggests that debates that appear to be about 
scientific evidence may instead be fueled by something entirely 
unrelated to the veracity of the science: the policies most com- 
monly proposed as the solution. Moreover, to the extent this is so, 
it suggests that the solution to scientific skepticism— especially 
skepticism that is found among politicians and citizens but is 
almost entirely absent from the scientific community (Cook et al., 
2013)—is not to simply present the public with more or better data 
but to consider other motivating factors. Over the past decade, the 
main strategy to reduce climate change and environmental skep- 
ticism has often been an “education only” strategy that has paid 
little attention to ideological concerns. 
The solution aversion model proposed here predicts that people 
will be skeptical of scientific evidence supporting the existence of 
a problem, to the degree that the existence of the problem directly 
implies solutions that threaten a person’s cherished beliefs and 
ideological motives (Jost, 2006; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). 
When located in the context of climate change and debates over 
the science surrounding it, this framework predicts that the denial 
of scientific evidence will vary across people, specifically along 
ideological lines, to the extent the proposed solution to the scien- 
tific problem is discordant with ideological positions. 
The most commonly discussed policy solutions to climate 
change have overwhelmingly been pollution taxes, emissions re- 
strictions,  and  general  governmental  intervention  (Greenpeace, 
2011;  Hansen,  Stiglitz,  Pachauri,  &  Rosenzweig,  2008;  Koba, 
2013). In the media, government policies that curtail unregulated 
businesses that operate and pollute in a free market are presented 
as the most important steps in solving climate change (Cutting, 
2013). These restrictive government policies contradict the ideol- 
ogies of many Republicans; in particular, ideological beliefs in the 
efficacy of free markets and limited government regulation 
(GOP.com, 2014; Jost et al., 2003; Platform Committee, 2012). 
The principle of free markets and limited government intervention 
is an important (if not the most important) ideological principle to 
many Republicans. Prominent conservative Republicans recently 
demonstrated their commitment to free markets through their 
willingness to force the government of the United States into a 
shutdown in October 2013 over the Affordable Care Act—a policy 
that restricts free markets in certain ways (Narula, Jacobs, & 
Ohikuare, 2013). In contrast, for Democrats, free market concerns 
are far less important and may at times even be contradictory to 
some Democrats’ ideologies. In general, then, for Republicans but 
not for Democrats, the popular conception of climate change may 
threaten the general merits of their political ideology as a guide to 
societal success. As such, Republicans may be motivated to deny 
climate change and other environmental problems in order to deny 
the implications that the existence of such problems holds for their 
ideological values. 
The current work tests this notion experimentally. According to 
a solution aversion perspective, Republicans’ skepticism of cli- 
mate change is motivated not solely by sensitivity to threat and 
danger, as other perspectives suggest (Carraro et al., 2011; Jost et 
al., 2003; Oxley et al., 2008), but also by the salient policy 
solutions. To the extent this is so, we should observe that Repub- 
licans’ belief in the veracity of environmental science should be (a) 
especially dependent on Republicans’ perceptions of the popularly 
discussed  policy  consequences  associated  with  environmental 
problems and (b) dependent on how strongly individual Republi- 
cans hold specific ideological beliefs that are challenged by these 
policies (such as faith in the free market). This model also leads to 
the prediction that if solutions to some societal issue (e.g., crime) 
strongly threatened an important ideological value held by Dem- 
ocrats or those with a more liberal stance (e.g., strongly restricting 
gun ownership), these individuals would show similar ideologi- 
cally motivated skepticism of the associated problem. By manip- 
ulating the various policy implications associated with problems 
and measuring acceptance of the science and belief in severity of 
problems, we tested these hypotheses across four studies. 
The first two studies focused on climate change. In these two 
studies we presented all participants with the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change’s 2007 estimate that global temperatures 
will rise by approximately 3.2 degrees Fahrenheit in the 21st 
century and that humans are in large part the causal agent (this 
statistic  represents  a  lower  estimate  by  the  Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, 2007). We used participants’ own 
subsequent estimation of the number of degrees that they believe 
temperatures will rise in the 21st century to measure agreement 
with climate change science (as well as a general Likert scale 
measure typical of past research). This numeric-dependent mea- 
sure allowed us to assess on a more granular level how Democrats 
and Republicans are interpreting the specific climate statistics, as 
opposed to other issues intertwined with the statistic, such as 
general beliefs about the importance of the environment or hu- 
mankind’s role in affecting climate change (Feinberg & Willer, 
2011; Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010; McCright & Dunlap, 
2011b). In Study 1, we used a correlational design to examine how 
Republicans’ and Democrats’ beliefs about the economic impact 
of climate change solutions relate to their beliefs about climate 
change science. In Study 2, we used these correlational insights to 
inform an experimental design that manipulates the types of pol- 
icies ostensibly being proposed to address climate science (i.e., 
ones that are more and less compatible with a free market ideol- 
ogy) and then examined how these manipulated policy implica- 
tions of climate change influence Republicans’ and Democrats’ 
interpretations of the climate science statistic. In Study 3, we more 
closely examined how individual differences in attachment to free 
market ideology among Republicans influence skepticism toward 
an environmental issue. 
Finally, in Study 4, we looked at a separate issue (crime) with a 
different ideology (attitudes toward gun rights) and assessed peo- 
ple’s feelings about the severity of the problem rather than judg- 
ments about scientific fact. This allowed us to better test the 
breadth of the model and to examine a situation where those with 
a more liberal stance might show skepticism that fits a solution 
aversion perspective. 
 
 
Study 1 
 
We have suggested that the political party divide in skepticism 
toward climate science is at least partly due to the political policy 
discussion surrounding climate change that generally proposes 
policy solutions unfriendly to Republican ideology (Hansen et al., 
2008; Koba, 2013) but not unfriendly to Democratic ideology. In 
Study 1, we tested this hypothesis correlationally. 
We surveyed Republicans and Democrats taken from an online 
sample who had previously indicated their political status. This
  
allowed us to preselect on party without making party salient in the 
design itself. We measured (a) their beliefs about climate change 
science, (b) their beliefs about the impact of climate change 
solutions on the economy, and (c) the strength of their belief in a 
free market ideology. 
This design allowed us to offer an initial test of whether differ- 
ences in ideological concerns are related to differences in climate 
change belief. We were particularly interested in testing whether 
differences in beliefs about climate changes were mediated by 
differences in concerns about the impact of climate change solu- 
tions on the economy.1 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants.    One hundred and eighty-nine participants were 
recruited  online  for  a  short  survey  using  Qualtrics  samples 
There was initially some question as to whether to use the 
number 3.0 or 3.2 as the cutoff for agreement versus disagreement 
with climate change science. Whereas the second author had 
assumed we would use 3.2, the first author assumed 3.0 was the 
correct number. The case for using the number 3.2 was that it was 
the exact number offered by the IPCC. The case against it was that 
eliminating those who offered the number 3 was eliminating those 
who were agreeing and just rounding to a nearly identical whole 
number, which seemed feasible. Ultimately, after we cross- 
checked people’s responses on the estimate measure with their 
responses to conceptually similar continuous measures of climate 
science agreement that were also included (one in Study 1 and two 
in Study 2), it became obvious that 3.0 was the most appropriate 
cutoff. Indeed, every analysis we conducted to examine whether 
3.0 was the most appropriate cutoff for belief in climate change 
suggested it best distinguished between agreement and disagree- 
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(male     72, female     117; Mage    44.31 years, SD     16.50) and 
ment. In Study 2, for example, we added a continuous scale
were paid $0.75. Participants were recruited on the basis of pre- 
viously reported affiliation as Republican (N      95) or Democrat 
(N      94) to Qualtrics. In all studies reported, participants were 
excluded prior to entry into the main survey if they had already 
taken an online survey on the topic with our lab, had failed an 
attention check, or had the same Internet protocol (IP) address as 
a prior participant. 
Materials and procedure.    In this and all studies, all relevant 
measures  administered  are  described  and  reported.  Participants 
first answered a number of filler questions, such as television 
preferences, that were meant to be irrelevant. Next, participants 
were presented with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change statistic, which read, “The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) reported that there would be an increase of 
3.2 degrees Fahrenheit in worldwide temperatures in the 21st 
century and that humans are responsible for global climate change 
patterns.” We then administered two measures of belief in climate 
change, one dichotomous and one continuous. 
First, participants were asked, “If nothing is done by humans 
with regard to the environment, how many degrees do you think 
global temperatures will rise in this century?” and were told to 
write down a number of degrees Fahrenheit. We classified people 
as disagreeing if they estimated that temperatures would rise less 
than the IPCC suggested (lower than 3.0) and as agreeing if they 
estimated anything at or beyond the IPCC statistic. This agreement 
measure used self-reported temperature estimates to provide a 
straightforward measure of agreement versus disagreement with 
science that supports the existence of climate change. Coding this 
as a linear measure, in which lower numbers are assumed to 
indicate more skepticism toward climate change (or higher num- 
bers are assumed to indicate more acceptance), was not feasible 
because there is a nonlinear relationship between the numbers on 
the scale and agreement with the science; that is, the distinction 
between two estimates of, say, 3.5 and 4.5 or 1.5 and 2.5 is much 
less meaningful than the distinction between two estimates of 2.5 
and 3.5 (even though all pairs involve a difference of 1 degree). 
This is because the latter pair involves moving across the actual 
number offered by IPCC, but the first two pairs do not. Coding 
disagreement continuously as an absolute value away from, say, 
3.0 degrees also does not work because this leaves a large asym- 
metry in range of responses in the two directions. 
intended to measure agreement with the climate change science 
presented.  Tellingly,  no  significant  differences  on  this  alterna- 
tive measure were found between those who estimated temperature 
increases of 3.0, 3.2, or higher on the degree estimate measure, but 
all three of these groups differed from those reporting an estimate 
of 2.9 or below. In the present study (i.e., Study 1), we did not have 
that continuous agreement measure to cross-check our coding 
scheme with, but we did have a continuous measure of belief that 
humans were causing climate change. Looking at responses to that 
measure as a function of people’s temperature estimates revealed 
the identical pattern: Those who indicated temperature increases of 
3.0, 3.2, or above 3.2 did not differ from one another, but all three 
of those groups were significantly higher in belief than those 
reporting an estimate of 2.9 or below. 
Because this dichotomous measure sacrifices our ability to 
conduct continuous analyses and does not capture beliefs about 
whether humankind has played a role in climate change (a belief 
 
 
1  It is important to note that we did not claim that this model would 
explain all the variance in climate change beliefs, for two reasons. First, our 
measures,  like  any  measure,  are  limited  in  capturing  the  true  effect. 
Second, other processes (differential exposure, faith in science, fear reac- 
tivity, party-line stances) certainly explain some of the variance in the 
political climate change divide. The solution aversion model is not a 
mutually exclusive hypothesis. 
2  To check whether our coding scheme made sense, we coded partici- 
pants at one of four degree estimate levels: L1, below 3.0; L2, at 3.0; L3, 
at 3.2; or L4, above 3.2. No participant indicated a number between 3.0 and 
3.2. We then conducted a one-way analysis of variance using these 4 levels 
as the predictor variable and participant responses on the continuous 
measure of humans causing climate change in Study 1 and separately in 
Study 2. This revealed significant models, FStudy  1(1, 185)   10.58, p   
.001, FStudy  2   (1,117)      11.88, p      .001, such that in their respective 
studies participants at L1 showed a significantly lower climate change 
belief on the continuous measure than did those at any of the other levels 
(individual contrast tests, psStudy 1     .004, psStudy 2     .001). None of the 
other levels showed a significant difference among themselves (psStudy  1   
.418, psStudy 2     .703), including the key comparison between L2 and L3, 
indicating that 3.0 and 3.2 indicated similar agreement with the climate 
change science. Next, we conducted the same analysis but with the con- 
tinuous variable measuring agreement with the IPCC statistic that was 
added to Study 2 to test our assumptions. This revealed a similar significant 
model, F(1, 117)     31.85, p     .001, such that participants at L1 showed 
a significantly lower agreement than did those at any of the other levels 
(individual contrast tests, ps     .001), but none of the other levels differed 
from each other (ps     .389).
  
that other research on climate change has used as a proxy of denial 
because it is considered of particular importance in motivating 
collective action, Krosnick, Holbrook, Lowe, & Visser, 2006), the 
next screen presented participants with the aforementioned ques- 
tion asking them whether they agree that humans have played a 
role in causing climate change. Responses to this item were given 
on  an  8-point  scale  anchored  at  No  chance  that  humans  are 
causing global climate change and Humans are certainly causing 
global climate change. 
Next, we assessed how participants felt climate change solutions 
would impact the economy. Participants read, “There are a few 
popular solutions that have been proposed to reduce climate 
change. If these solutions were passed into law, what kind of effect 
do you think these solutions would have on the American econ- 
omy?” Participants answered on 7-point scale anchor at    3 (Have 
a strong NEGATIVE effect on the American economy) to 3 (Have 
a strong POSITIVE effect on the American economy). This ques- 
tion referred only to “solutions.” Not mentioning any specific 
solutions allowed us to test whether, without our interference, 
Republicans (more than Democrats) naturally associated negative 
economic impact more with climate change solutions. Therefore, 
this experiment provides evidence for an organically occurring 
solution aversion effect on the part of Republicans, rather than the 
experimentally induced solution aversion effects that are tested 
later in the paper. 
Finally, on a separate screen, all participants read a passage 
about the free market, which stated, 
 
When the government does not interfere with the economy it creates 
what is known as the “Free Market.” Free Markets are called “free” 
because they are free of governmental regulation. Making markets 
more free is the foundation of the conservative (Republican) eco- 
nomic philosophy. The United States founding fathers created the 
United States as a Free Market Nation. 
 
They then were asked to indicate (a) how much they agreed with 
the statement “The Free Market makes a country great” and (b) 
how much they supported free market ideology on unmarked 
sliding point scales (each question’s scale had 101 distinct points). 
These two items were averaged and were used as a measure of 
endorsement  of  free  market  ideology  (r    .87,  p    .001,  M   
70.47, SD     25.38). 
 
 
Results 
 
Difference in party beliefs.    In a result replicating the past 
decade of survey polling data (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a, 2011b; 
Pew Research Center, 2010; Schuldt et al., 2011), Republicans 
were more skeptical of climate change science than were Demo- 
crats. This was observed on both dependent measures. On the 
dichotomous agreement measure, Republicans were less likely to 
agree  with  the  climate  change  science  than  were  Democrats; 
respectively,  60%  agreement  and  80.85%  agreement,  2(1,  N   
189)     9.85, p     .002. On the continuous likelihood measure of 
human causation, Republicans were less likely to indicate human- 
kind was causing global climate change than were Democrats; 
respectively, M      4.83, SD      1.19 and M      6.49, SD      1.54, 
t(187)     6.55, p     .001. 
Also as predicted, Republicans reported that the solutions to 
climate change would have a more negative effect on the economy 
than did Democrats; respectively, M          0.42, SD      1.83 and 
M     0.55, SD     1.80, t(187)     4.06, p     .001. Republicans also 
reported stronger endorsement of free market ideology than did 
Democrats; respectively, M     82.24, SD     18.48 and M     58.59, 
SD     25.95, t(187)     7.22, p     .001. 
Mediation: Effect of economic beliefs on climate change 
between parties.    Next we tested whether the difference between 
Republicans’ and Democrats’ belief in climate science was medi- 
ated by their different beliefs about the impact of climate change 
solutions on the economy. Two separate analyses were conducted 
with each of the two climate changes measures: the likelihood of 
human causation measure and the agreement measure. A simple 
mediation bootstrapping procedure (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 
2007) in a PROCESS SPSS macro (Model 4; 5,000 bootstraps; 
Hayes, 2012), with Democrats coded as 1 and Republicans coded 
as 0, revealed a significant indirect effect of political affiliation on 
both measures of climate change beliefs through beliefs about 
economic impact: likelihood that humans are the cause measure, 
b     .35, SE     .13, 95% CI [.157, .657]; dichotomous agreement 
with climate change science measure, b     .39, SE     .16, 95% CI 
[150, .770]. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Together, these correlational and mediation findings support the 
hypothesis that beliefs about the impact of climate science solu- 
tions (for the economy, in particular) are linked to Republicans’ 
beliefs about climate change science and may in fact drive their 
increased skepticism when compared to Democrats. That is, Re- 
publicans more than Democrats see climate change solutions as a 
greater threat to the economy, and Republicans’ economic beliefs 
about climate change policies mediate their skepticism of climate 
change science. At the same time, these results are correlational, 
and so caution must be exercised when making any conclusions 
about causality. To hone in on causality, Study 2 shifted to an 
experimental paradigm. 
 
 
Study 2 
 
If the policy implications of climate change truly are a causal 
mechanism of Republicans’ skepticism toward climate science, as 
Study 1 suggests, we should observe an abated skepticism among 
Republicans when we directly manipulate the nature of the solu- 
tions to be less inconsistent with their values. 
To this end, in Study 2 we varied the policy solutions we paired 
with the IPCC statistic. Half of the participants read about one of 
the most popularly discussed solutions to climate change: a regu- 
latory restrictive emissions policy. This policy should be very 
unfriendly to Republican ideology but friendly to Democratic 
ideology. The other participants read about a free market friendly 
solution that involved the United States profiting from green 
technology, a policy that should be friendly to both parties’ ide- 
ology. We predicted that Republicans would be more likely to 
agree with climate science when the policy was free market 
friendly than when it involved government regulation. For Dem- 
ocrats, however, we expected agreement with climate science to 
be relatively similar across the two policy solutions. Further, we 
predicted that the changes in Republican skepticism would be 
mediated by changes in Republican participants’ views that the
  
climate change solutions threaten the economy. This experimental 
design (that includes mediation) offers an especially rigorous test 
of the solution aversion model. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants.    In this experiment and the following two exper- 
iments, we used a different recruitment database (Amazon Me- 
chanical Turk). In this study, we did not ask for political affiliation 
in a separate pretest phase and simply recruited equal numbers of 
Republicans and Democrats on the basis of a predetermined sam- 
ple size. Party was assessed at the end the study. Our goal was for 
20 participants per cell, but knowing Amazon Mechanical Turk is 
overrepresented with Democrats, we assumed we would need to 
oversample to ensure enough Republicans (i.e., rather than recruit 
80 participants and assume 40 of each party would be represented 
in the sample, we needed to recruit toward a target of 120 to obtain 
a minimum of 40 per party). This method led to an imbalance in 
the number of Republican and Democrat participants but still 
resulted in statistically sufficient numbers of both. Of the 121 
participants (male   52, female   69; Mage   35.06 years, SD   
14.21) on Amazon Mechanical Turk who completed our experi- 
ment and reported affiliation with one of the two target parties, 81 
self-reported as Democrats and 40 self-reported as Republicans. 
This left us with the target number of 20 participants per experi- 
mental condition. Persons who reported they were independent/not 
affiliated (n     39) were not analyzed. Condition did not influence 
self-reported party affiliation. Participants were paid $0.45. 
Materials and procedure.  Participants were randomly as- 
signed to one of two current event conditions (full stimuli are 
available  in  the  online  supplemental  materials).  Both  current 
events recounted quotes from a speech we created about climate 
change, in which the speaker cited the complete IPCC statistic 
statement. In the free market friendly condition, the speaker de- 
scribed how the United States could help stop climate change and 
profit from leading the world in green technology. In the govern- 
ment regulation condition, the speaker described how the United 
States could help stop climate change and lead the world in 
restrictive emissions policies. 
Participants then answered the two belief in climate science 
items from Study 1 (i.e., the dichotomized temperature estimate 
item and the continuous item asking about the human role) and, as 
a manipulation check and potential mediator, the item from Study 
1 that measured beliefs that climate change solutions will nega- 
tively impact the economy. 
Three new dependent variables were added in this experiment. 
The first new dependent variable— described in Study 1—asked 
participants to indicate how much they agreed with the 3.2 esti- 
mate on a 7-point agreement scale from Strongly Disagree to 
Strongly Agree. This measure was included specifically to ensure 
that the dichotomous coding scheme used in Study 1 and again 
here—in which we place our cutoff for agreement as 3.0 rather 
than 3.2—was reasonable. Note that this measure does not serve as 
a feasible continuous measure of whether someone believes cli- 
mate change is in fact happening but only as an indicator of 
whether someone agrees with the specific IPCC statistic. This is 
because those who indicate “disagree” on that particular scale 
might do so for two reasons: either because they think climate 
change is real but the actual number is higher or because they do 
not believe in climate change. As a result, we could not use this 
indicator in our main analyses. 
The second new dependent variable was the integrated beliefs 
measure. We asked participants which statement from the follow- 
ing list best characterized their opinion: (a) Climate change is real, 
humans are causing it, and humans can fix it; (b) Climate change 
is  real,  humans  are  causing  it,  and  humans  cannot  fix  it;  (c) 
Climate change is real, humans are not causing it, and humans can 
fix it; (d) Climate change is real, humans are not causing it, and 
humans cannot fix it; (e) Climate change is not real. This measure 
allowed us to test three beliefs in conjunction: the belief that 
climate change exists, the belief humans are causing climate 
change, and the belief humans can fix it—and different combina- 
tions of these. This variable also served as a more straightforward 
measure of denial of humankind caused climate change. 
The third new dependent variable was intended to be a broader 
version of the economic impact of the solution question. This 
favorable-solution  measure  asked  participants  to  complete  the 
statement “The proposed solutions to climate change are .  . .” on 
a 7-point scale from    3 (Very Bad Ideas) to 3 (Very Good Ideas). 
Participants responded to the measures in the following order: 
the dichotomous agreement with climate change science measure, 
the continuous agreement with the IPCC statistic measure, the 
likelihood humans are causing climate change measure, the inte- 
grated belief measure, the problems measure, and the economy 
measure. 
 
 
Results 
 
Manipulation check.    First, it was necessary to ensure that our 
manipulation of policy solutions did in fact make the solutions less 
threatening to core ideological values of Republicans. To this end, 
we conducted a 2 (party: Democrat vs. Republican)      2 (policy 
solutions: government regulation vs. free market friendly) analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) on the measure gauging participants’ feel- 
ings about how the policy would impact the economy. There was 
a significant main effect of party affiliation, such that Democrats 
(M      1.22, SD      1.56) compared to Republicans (M         0.22, 
SD     2.11) reported more positive beliefs about the effect of the 
climate solutions on the economy, F(1, 117)      23.41, p      .001, 
 2    .14. There was a significant main effect of solution, such that 
those who saw the free market friendly solution (M   1.24, SD   
1.54) compared to those who saw the government regulatory 
solution (M      0.15, SD      2.08) reported more positive beliefs 
about the impact of climate solutions on the economy, F(1, 117)  
19.20,  p       .001,    2     .115.  This  analysis  also  revealed  the 
predicted interactive pattern, F(1, 117)     6.84, p     .01,   2    .06. 
Republicans were much more likely to say solutions would rela- 
tively improve the economy when the solutions were presented as 
free market policy (M      0.77, SD      1.78) than when they were 
presented as regulatory policy (M          1.44, SD      1.85), F(1, 
117)       7.31, p       .008,    2     .156. Democrats’ beliefs about 
economic impact, on the other hand, did not significantly vary 
across condition and were generally positive: free market friendly 
policy, M   1.48, SD   1.37; regulatory policy, M   0.92, SD   
1.72, F(1, 117)     2.35, p     .128,   2    .020. 
Continuous measure of likelihood of the human role.    We 
conducted a 2 (party: Democrat vs. Republican)     2 (policy 
solutions:   government   regulation   vs.   free   market   friendly)
  
ANOVA on the measure of the human causal role. There was a 
significant main effect of party affiliation, such that Democrats 
(M      6.70, SD      1.28) compared to Republicans (M      4.77, 
SD      2.09) reported strong beliefs in the likelihood of human 
causation,  F(1,  117)       48.58,  p       .001,    2     .255,  and  a 
significant main effect of solution, such that those who saw the 
free market friendly solution (M     6.45, SD     1.68) compared to 
those who saw the government regulation solution (M      5.60, 
SD      1.90) reported stronger beliefs in the likelihood of human 
causation, F(1, 117)     16.01, p     .001,   2    .084. 
Of importance, the analysis also revealed the predicted interac- 
tive pattern, F(1, 117)     8.78, p     .004,   2    .05 (see Figure 1). 
To explore this interaction, we tested the effect of policy solutions 
separately for each party. Self-identified Republicans reported 
significantly higher belief in the human role when the policy 
solution was free market friendly (M      5.68, SD      2.08) than 
when the policy involved governmental regulation (M       3.67, 
SD     1.53), F(1, 117)     18.10, p     .001,   2    .10. Self-identified 
Democrats’ belief in the human role did not vary significantly 
across policy solutions, F(1, 117)      0.53, p      .467,   2     .003 
(Mfree   market   friendly     6.84,  SD    1.31;  Mgovernment   regulation    
6.54, SD     1.24). 
With the same dependent measure, we also examined the hy- 
pothesis that the political divide over climate change would be 
more pronounced with the government regulatory solution and 
would be attenuated (or eliminated) with the free market friendly 
solution. As hypothesized, the political divide over climate change 
was affected by the policy solution, such that self-identified Dem- 
ocrats were more likely than self-identified Republicans to believe 
that humans were causing climate change when the policy solution 
was governmental regulation, F(1, 117)   45.03, p   .001,  2    
.24, but this difference was attenuated (though still significant) 
when the policy was free market friendly, F(1, 117)   8.87, p   
.004,   2    0.05. 
Dichotomous measure of (dis)agreement.  Next, we con- 
ducted a binary logistic regression of dichotomous measure of agree- 
ment with climate change science (i.e., the dependent measure em- 
ployed in Study 1) on party, policy solution, and their interaction. As 
shown  in  Figure  2,  the  model  revealed  the  predicted  interactive 
pattern, b     1.41, Wald   2(1)     2.70, p     .10, though, in this case, 
the overall interaction term did not reach full significance. However, 
because the thrust of our prediction is about the simple effects (i.e., 
that Republicans but not Democrats will be affected by the ma- 
nipulation) and the pattern is identical to the other significant 
interaction effects reported across all our studies, we examined the 
simple effects of policy solution for Republicans and Democrats 
separately. Exploring the interaction revealed results that mirrored 
those observed with the continuous measure. Self-identified Re- 
publicans reported significantly higher rates of agreement with the 
climate change science when the policy solution was free market 
friendly (55%) than when the policy was governmental regulation 
(22%),   2(1, N     40)     4.31, p     .038. However, self-identified 
Democrats’ rates of agreement did not significantly depend on 
whether the policy solution was free market friendly (68%) or 
governmental regulation (68%),   2(1, N     81)     .003, p     .953. 
Also, as hypothesized, the political divide over climate change was 
affected by the policy, such that Republicans were more likely than 
Democrats to disagree with climate science when the policy solu- 
tion was governmental regulation,   2(1, N     55)     10.0, p     .002, 
but this divide was reduced when the policy was free market 
friendly,   2(1, N     66)     1.18, p     .278. 
Moderated mediation.    Finally, we assessed whether the sig- 
nificant interaction between political affiliation (Republican vs. 
Democrat) and solution (free market vs. government regulation) on 
climate change beliefs was mediated by differing views about how 
these solutions would impact the economy. To test this hypothesis, 
we conducted a moderated mediation bootstrapping procedure 
(Preacher et al., 2007) in a PROCESS SPSS macro (5,000 boot- 
straps; Hayes, 2012, Model 8), with the government regulatory 
solution coded as 1 and the free market solution coded as 0. We 
tested the indirect effect of policy solution on climate change 
beliefs through beliefs that the economy would be impacted by 
climate change solutions, conditional on political affiliation. Two 
separate analyses were conducted with each of the two climate 
changes belief measures: the continuous likelihood of human 
causation measure and the dichotomous agreement measure. 
For Republicans, we observed a significant indirect effect of 
climate change policy through opinions regarding the economic
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.   Likelihood that humans are causing climate change by self-reported political party affiliation and 
proposed policy solution (Study 2). All bars are significantly different (ps     .05) from one another except for 
the two Democrats bars. Error bars reflect the estimated least squared standard errors.
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.   Agreement with climate change science as a function of self-reported political party affiliation and 
proposed policy solutions (Study 2). Agreement was measured dichotomously as indicating a value of 3.0 
degrees or higher versus not. The first three bars are individually significantly different from the last bar (the 
Republicans in government regulation solution; ps     .05). There are no other significant differences. 
impact of climate change solutions for both measures of skepti- 
cism toward climate science: likelihood that humans are the cause 
measure,  b          1.00,  SE       .31,  95%  CI  [   1.691,     0.447]; 
dichotomous  agreement  with  climate  change  science  measure, 
b        1.01, SE     .43, 95% CI [   2.011,    0.360]. For Democrats, 
we observed no significant indirect effect of economic beliefs on 
climate change for either measure (both CIs contained zero): 
continuous likelihood measure, b          .25, SE       .17, 95% CI 
[ .636, .039]; dichotomous agreement measure, b    .25, SE   
.21, 95% CI [   .748, .052]. In other words, Republican participants 
thought the government regulation solution would exert more 
negative consequences on the economy than would the free market 
solution, and this in turn led to their increased skepticism toward 
climate change science. This solution aversion pattern was absent 
for Democrat participants. 
Integrated beliefs.  Using this variable, we first assessed 
whether policy solution had an effect on participants’ tendency to 
hold the integrated belief that climate change was real, was caused 
by humans, and could be fixed by humans (that is, selecting 1 vs. 
Good or bad solutions.    This measure mirrors the economic 
impact of solutions measure. We conducted a 2 (party: Democrat 
vs. Republican)     2 (policy solutions: government regulation vs. 
free market friendly) ANOVA on the measure. There was a sig- 
nificant main effect of party affiliation, such that Democrats (M  
1.59, SD     1.07) compared to Republicans (M     0.23, SD     1.79) 
reported  more  favorable  opinions  of  the  solutions,  F(1,  117)   
31.79, p      .001,   2    .20, and a main effect of solution, such 
that those who saw the free market friendly solution (M     1.38, 
SD      1.27) compared to those who saw the government regu- 
lation solution (M     0.85, SD     1.68) reported more favorable 
opinions  of  the  solutions,  F(1,  117)    8.36,  p    .005,  2     
.051. 
Of importance, this analysis also revealed the predicted inter- 
active pattern, F(1, 117)     5.37, p     .022,   2    .031. Republicans 
said the solutions were better ideas when the solutions were free 
market  policy  (M       0.82,  SD       1.70)  than  when  they  were 
regulatory policy (M         0.50, SD     1.65), F(1, 117)     10.119, 
2
2–5 on the integrated beliefs measure). Republicans were more 
p   .002,     .061. Democrats’ beliefs about the quality of the
likely  to  hold  this  integrated  belief  when  the  policy  was  free 
market friendly than when it was not (64% vs. 17%),  2(1, N   
ideas, on the other hand, did not significantly vary across condi- 
tion: free market friendly policy, M     1.48, SD     1.37; regulatory 
2
40)     8.94, p     .003. Democrats showed no significant difference policy, M   0.92, SD   1.72, F(1, 117)   .25, p   .618,  
(80% vs. 84%),   2(1, N     81)     0.24, p     .625. 
Next, we assessed whether policy solution had an effect on 
participants’ tendency to hold the integrated belief that climate 
change was real and caused by humans, which would indicate full 
agreement with the climate change science statement presented to 
participants (coded as selecting 1–2 vs. 3–5). Republicans were 
more likely to hold this integrated belief when the policy was free 
market friendly than when it was not (68% vs. 33%),  2(1, N   
40)     4.82, p     .028. Democrats showed no significant difference 
(93% vs. 92%),   2(1, N     81)     0.05, p     .825. 
These findings suggest that even when people are given the 
opportunity to distinguish between their beliefs regarding climate 
change, human involvement, and solution efficacy, a solution 
aversion effect regarding denial of humankind created climate 
change still occurs. 
.002. We conducted the same moderated mediation from above on 
the effect of policy through opinion about the solutions, condi- 
tional on party, on the continuous likelihood measure and sepa- 
rately on the dichotomous climate change science agreement mea- 
sure. As with the economic beliefs measure, these analyses 
revealed a significant indirect effect of opinions about the solu- 
tions for both climate belief measures for Republicans (contin- 
uous  likelihood  measure,  b            .89,  SE         .34,  95%  CI 
[   1.564,     .218]; dichotomous agreement measure, b          .84, 
SE      .48, 95% CI [   2.01,    .139]) but not for Democrats (con- 
tinuous likelihood measure, b        .10, SE     .16, 95% CI [   .449, 
.212]; dichotomous agreement measure, b        .09, SE     .18, 95% 
CI [   .509, .231]). That is, once again, increased skepticism to- 
ward climate change science is mediated by solution aversion for 
Republicans but not for Democrats.
  
Discussion 
 
These findings provide a robust combination of experimental 
and correlational support that Republicans’ skepticism toward 
climate change science is linked to beliefs about the policy solu- 
tions. Further, the findings indicate that when the policy solutions 
of climate change are made salient, solutions that favor a more free 
market policy approach rather than the more popularly discussed 
restrictive policy approach may lead Republicans to be less skep- 
tical of the available climate change science. 
 
 
Study 3 
 
Thus far, we have observed both correlational and experimental 
support for our solution aversion explanation of the political divide 
in climate science. The patterns of the evidence presented cannot 
be explained by alternative hypotheses—such as party differences 
in baseline exposure to the climate change science, fear sensitivity, 
or baseline faith in science—which would predict a consistent 
skepticism in climate science on the part of Republicans rather 
than a dissipation of skepticism when the associated solutions are 
manipulated. In Study 3, we sought to expand upon this line of 
inquiry in three ways. 
First, we isolated the effect of ideology further. If specific 
ideological beliefs—such as faith in the free market— can drive 
skepticism in climate beliefs, then even within self-identified Re- 
publicans we should observe (a) that belief in climate science 
varies by the strength with which Republicans endorse this belief 
and (b) belief in climate science interacts with manipulations of the 
solution that threaten this specific ideological belief. 
Second, for the sake of breadth we sought to examine a different 
environmental problem (the health effects of air pollution) to test 
that there was not something unique about how the climate change 
issue interacted with ideology. 
Third, we measured the denial of the scientific statistic in a more 
direct way. Instead of categorizing a continuous variable, we 
specifically asked people whether they believe that the factual 
reality of the air pollution is not as numerically as high as the 
statistic suggested (that 44 million Americans live in an area 
burdened by deadly particle pollution) or that the factual reality of 
the statistic was correct or even higher. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants.    One hundred twenty self-identified Republicans 
completed the survey (male     70, female     49, Decline to 
State/Other     1, Mage     31.64 years, SD     9.95) and were paid 
$0.45. Participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and let into this survey only if they reported their political affili- 
ation was Republican at the beginning of the survey (other partic- 
ipants were redirected to an unrelated survey). 
Procedure  and  materials.    First,  we  assessed  participants’ 
free market ideology. All participants first read the passage about 
the free market from Study 1 and answered the same two ques- 
tions, which were averaged in a single scale (r      .90, p      .001, 
M     79.08, SD     18.89). 
All participants then read a blog about a solution to the 
problem of air pollution, especially due to cars (full stimuli are 
available  in  the  supplemental  materials).  In  the  free  market 
friendly  condition,  the  blog  mentioned  how  the  free  market 
could be used to reduce the problem. For instance, it stated, 
“The solution is the free market . . . We need to make the public 
aware of the car pollution problem so the free market can work 
its magic through customer demands.” In the government reg- 
ulation condition, the blog mentioned how government regula- 
tion was needed to solve the problem. For instance, it stated, 
“The government must step in to reduce pollution  .  .  . include 
a restriction on car manufacturers that would require them to 
reduce pollution. Even if the solution was somewhat costly to 
the manufacturer, they would still be required to implement it.” 
Participants were then told the blog was in response to a recent 
statement by the American Lung Association estimating that “44 
million people live in an area burdened year-round by unhealthful 
levels of deadly particle pollution.” This statistic was taken from an 
American Lung Association website official report (State of the Air, 
2013). 
Next, participants responded to the trichotomous agreement 
variable. Participants were asked what they thought of the 44 
million estimate, and they responded by selecting one of three 
statements: “Probably not, that is probably an exaggeration,” 
“Probably yes,” and “It is probably even worse than 44 million” 
(the last option was not often chosen; 13%). We coded participants 
who indicated “probably not” as denying and the rest of the 
participants as agreeing, thus converting this trichotomous mea- 
sure into a dichotomous measure. 
Last, participants filled out a continuous measure similar to that 
in Studies 1 and 2. In this study participants were asked, “What is 
the likelihood that an American living in an urban city would 
develop health complications due to pollution?” Answers were 
made on an 8-point scale from No chance to Certainly. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
We hypothesized that denial of the problem of air pollution 
would vary as a function of both endorsement of free market 
ideology and the solution. 
Continuous  measure  of  likelihood  of  health  problems. 
First, we assessed these predictions in the context of the continu- 
ous measure of developing health problems. We conducted a linear 
regression of the continuous measure of likelihood to develop 
health problems on blogger condition (dummy coded 1 for free 
market friendly), self-reported strength of free market ideology, 
and their interaction. As presented in Figure 3, this revealed the 
predicted interactive pattern, b      .02, t(116)      1.20, p      .048. 
When the solution was government regulation, those with a stron- 
ger free market ideology were less likely to believe there was a 
high health risk, b         .02, t(116)         2.89, p     .005. When the 
solution was free market friendly, however, individual differences 
in free market ideology no longer predicted increased skepticism, 
b     .003, t(116)     0.38, p     .708. We also examined the effect of 
the solution at higher and lower levels of personal free market 
ideology following procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991). 
As hypothesized, among those who strongly held a free market 
ideology (1 SD above the mean), belief in a health risk was higher 
when the solution was free market friendly than when it was not, 
b      .83, t(116)      2.98, p      .003. Among those who did not 
strongly hold a free market ideology (1 SD below the mean), belief
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.   Likelihood of developing a health problem due to pollution as a function of the proposed solutions 
and strength of free market ideology (Study 3). Only Republicans were recruited for this study. Participants who 
supported free market ideology relatively more (1 SD from the mean) reported a higher likelihood of health 
problem as a function of solution, whereas participants who supported free market ideology relatively less (   1 
SD from mean) did not report a significant difference in likelihood by solution. 
 
in a health risk did not significantly differ by whether or not the 
solution was free market friendly, b     .01, t(116)     0.02, p     .98. 
Dichotomous measure of (dis)agreement.    Second, we tested 
the same hypotheses in the context of the dichotomous measure of 
agreement with the environmental science. We conducted a binary 
logistic regression of agreement on solution condition (dummy 
coded 1 for free market friendly), self-reported strength of free 
market ideology, and their interaction. We once again observed the 
predicted interactive pattern, b     .07, Wald   2(1)    5.98, p     .014 
(see Figure 4). When the solution was governmental regulation, 
those with a stronger free market ideology were less likely to agree 
with the environmental science, b         .04, Wald  2(1)     5.95, 
p      .015. When the solution was free market friendly, however, 
the strength of free market ideology did not significantly influence 
agreement with the environmental science, b  .03, Wald  2(1)  
1.40, p      .237. We also examined the effect of the solution at 
higher and lower levels of personal free market ideology. As 
hypothesized, among those who strongly held a free market ide- 
ology (1 SD above the mean), there was significantly more agree- 
ment with the environmental science when the solution was free 
market  friendly  than  when  it  was  not,  b    2.89,  Wald  2(1)   
16.65, p      .001. Among those who did not strongly hold a free 
market ideology (1 SD below the mean), their agreement with the 
environmental  science  did  not  significantly  differ  based  on 
whether or not the solution was free market friendly, b      .35, 
Wald   2(1)     0.26, p     .611.
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.   Agreement with environmental science on pollution as a function of the proposed solutions and 
strength of free market ideology (Study 3). Only Republicans were recruited for this study. Agreement was 
measured dichotomously; indicating the severity of pollution was at or above the environmental science estimate 
provided was coded as agreement. Participants who supported free market ideology relatively more (1 SD from 
the mean) reported higher agreement as a function of solution, whereas participants who supported free market 
ideology relatively less (   1 SD from mean) did not report a significant difference in agreement by solution.
  
These findings provide further evidence for the solution aver- 
sion hypothesis. Among Republican participants—that is, those 
who showed the motivated effects in both of the previous two 
studies— belief in the existence of environmental science varied as 
a function not only of the solution but also of the strength of their 
strength free market ideology. This isolates the role of ideology 
beyond simple party affiliation. 
 
 
Study 4 
 
In Studies 1 through 3, consistent with our solution aversion hy- 
pothesis, Republicans showed motivated skepticism of environmental 
statistics as a function of the extent to which the solutions threatened 
their ideology. This solution aversion tendency, however, should not 
be unique to Republicans and conservative ideologies or adherents. 
That is,  if  a  problem  existed  for  which  the  associated  solutions 
strongly threatened individuals with a liberal ideology (i.e., desire for 
gun control), we should observe solution aversion on the part of these 
individuals. We test this hypothesis in Study 4. 
Beyond looking at solution aversion tendencies in those with 
more a more liberal ideology, we made three additional changes in 
Study 4 to broaden our perspective. First, we examined a problem 
unassociated with the environment: criminal activity. Second, we 
looked at more general beliefs about the severity of the problem, 
rather than whether it is occurring or not. And third, we used both 
a dichotomous and a continuous measure of ideology (i.e., our 
predictor variable) in the same experimental design instead of one 
or the other as we did in Study 2 and Study 3. 
Participants.    One  hundred  ninety-eight  participants  com- 
pleted a survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk (male      126, fe- 
male     72, Mage    32.95 years, SD     11.01) and were paid $0.45. 
Procedure  and  materials.    Participants  first  indicated  their 
stance  on  gun  control  from  three  options:  “I  am  in  favor  of 
protecting gun ownership rights,” “I am in favor of stricter gun 
control and restrictions on gun ownership,” and “Other/No Opin- 
ion.” This gave us our primary dichotomous predictor variable of 
gun control supporters and gun-rights supporters. 
Next we assessed the gun control ideology of all 198 partici- 
pants on two continuous measures (r      .70, p      .001) that we 
combined into a two-item scale. Participants indicated how much 
they agreed with two statements on 6-point scale from Not At All 
to Strongly Agree: “The United States should protect citizens’ right 
to own guns” and “The United States should have stronger gun 
control laws and more restrictions on gun purchases” (reverse 
coded). Participants were then told they would read about the topic 
of “Intruder violence—the act of breaking into a home and attack- 
ing the resident, usually as part of a robbery. Intruder violence 
often ends in the death or injury of the resident.” 
On the next page of the survey, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two solution conditions (see the supplemental 
materials for full stimuli). In the anti-gun control condition, par- 
ticipants were told they would read an article arguing that “strict 
gun control laws prevent homeowners from getting guns that they 
could use to protect themselves from intruder violence” and then 
read an article espousing this pro-gun rights ideal. In the gun 
control friendly condition, participants were told they would read 
an article arguing that “loose gun control laws lead to more gun 
violence by intruders and more homeowner deaths” and then read 
an article espousing this pro-gun control ideal. 
Over the next three pages participants answered three questions 
about the severity of the problem of intruder violence. These three 
questions were presented in a fixed order and were averaged into a 
single z-score standardized scale (        .77, M     3.18, SD     1.57). 
Participants first indicated how much they agreed with the statement 
“There is an epidemic of intruder violence in the United States” on a 
7-point scale (Not At All Agree to Strongly Agree). Next, participants 
indicated how much they agreed with the statement “In general, 
intruder violence is rare, so we should not be very worried about it” 
on a 6-point scale (reverse coded; Not At All Agree to Strongly Agree). 
Finally, participants responded to the question “How much should the 
average American be worried about intruder violence?” on a 6-point 
scale (Not At All Worried to Very Worried). 
 
 
Results 
 
We first conducted tests of whether the manipulations of associated 
solutions differentially affected those who indicated they were a 
supporter of gun rights differently than those who indicated they were 
supporters of gun control. We then conducted the same tests with the 
continuous measure of gun control ideology with all participants. 
A 2 (ideology: gun rights supporter vs. gun control supporter)     2 
(policy solutions: anti-gun control vs. gun control friendly) ANOVA 
was conducted on the severity of intruder violence measure. There 
were significant main effects of both gun control stance and solution, 
such that gun control supporters (M     .10, SD     .78) compared to 
gun rights supporters (M        .16, SD    .87) were less likely to report 
the problem as severe, F(1, 174)     5.04, p     .026,   2    .042, and 
those who saw anti-gun control policy (M          .13, SD       .83) 
compared to those who saw the gun control friendly policy (M     .13, 
SD      .80) were less likely to report the problem was severe, F(1, 
174)     8.39, p     .004,   2    .025. 
Of importance, the analysis also revealed the predicted interac- 
tive pattern, F(1, 174)     11.66, p     .001,   2    .059 (see Figure 
5). To explore this interaction, we tested the effect of policy 
solutions separately for each group. Self-identified gun control 
supporters reported a significantly higher severity of the intruder 
violence problem when the policy solution was gun control 
friendly (M     .21, SD     .77) than when the solution was anti-gun 
control (M  .55, SD  .80), F(1, 174)  16.42, p  .001,  2    
.082. Self-identified gun rights supporters, however, reported di- 
rectionally lower severity of the intruder violence problem when 
the policy solution was gun control friendly (M     .07, SD     .82) 
than when it was anti-gun control (M      .13, SD      .74), F(1, 
174)     0.17, p     .681,   2    .001. 
Next, we assessed these predictions with the complete sample 
using the continuous gun control ideology measure, in which higher 
ratings indicated a stronger preference for gun control ideology. That 
is, we conducted a linear regression of the severity of intruder vio- 
lence scale (dummy coded as 1 for gun control friendly), self-reported 
gun control ideology, and their interaction. As presented in Figure 6, 
this revealed the predicted interactive pattern, b     .17, t(194)     2.29, 
p     .023. When the solution was anti-gun control, those with a higher 
gun control ideology were less likely to believe there was a severe 
intruder violence problem risk, b        .14, t(194)     2.79, p     .006. 
When the solution was gun control friendly, however, those with a 
higher gun control ideology were directionally more likely to believe 
there was a severe intruder violence problem health risk, b      .03, 
t(194)    0.49, p    .628. We also examined the effect of the blogger’s
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.   Severity of intruder violence as a function of self-reported supporter status (gun control or gun rights) 
and proposed policy solutions (Study 4). Only participants who selected into gun rights supporter or gun control 
supporter were analyzed. The dependent variable is z-score standardized, and error bars reflect the estimated least 
squared standard errors for the z score. Solution had a significant effect only on gun control supporters. 
 
solution at higher and lower levels of support for gun control (fol- 
lowing procedures outlined by Aiken & West, 1991). As hypothe- 
sized, those who strongly held a gun control ideology (1 SD above the 
mean) indicated a higher belief in the severity of intruder violence 
when the solution was gun control friendly than when it was not, b  
.45, t(194)     2.79, p     .006. Those lower on gun control ideology (1 
SD below the mean), indicated a directionally lower belief in the 
severity  of  intruder  violence  when the  solution  was  gun  control 
friendly than when it was not, b        .08, t(194)     0.49, p     .640. 
 
Discussion 
 
Together these, findings provide evidence for solution aversion 
outside of the environmental domain and among participants high 
in an ideology that is not conservative. Though we did not observe 
a significant solution aversion pattern for those who advocated gun 
right ownership, the overall interaction pattern and the specific 
effects for those who held the more liberal, gun right restriction 
ideology were all significant and consistent with a solution aver- 
sion prediction. Polling data tend to show that the majority of those 
who favor gun ownership rights also tend to favor some measures 
of gun control (Drake, 2014), so for those supportive of gun 
ownership rights, the gun control friendly condition may not have 
seemed especially aversive. This may also be the case for those 
with more liberal economic ideologies in the environmental stud- 
ies. Because they may not be strongly anti-free market, they may 
not react strongly to suggestions of free market solutions. 
 
General Discussion 
 
Across four studies, we provide triangulating support for a solution 
aversion model in the domain of environmental science and demon- 
strate breadth in a second domain. These data suggest that skepticism 
toward issues such as climate change and environmental science may
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.   Severity of intruder violence as a function of self-reported gun control ideology and proposed policy 
solutions (Study 4). All Study 4 participants were analyzed. The dependent variable is z-score standardized. 
Solution had a significant affect only on those higher in gun control ideology.
  
be caused in part by the unique implications climate change solutions 
hold for certain individuals’ ideological values, rather than just simply 
a blanket tendency for certain individuals or groups to dislike science 
or deny catastrophe and problems. This process distinction is impor- 
tant, because it suggests not only a novel trigger of motivated cogni- 
tion (i.e., the solutions associated with problems, rather than the 
problems themselves) but also a more sophisticated way to approach 
interventions aimed at abating scientific skepticism. 
 
 
Relation to Past Environmental Skepticism Research 
 
Locating much of our investigation in the specific context of 
environmental science offered us a unique opportunity not only to 
highlight an underappreciated form of motivated cognition but to do 
so in a way illustrates its incremental value in explaining an important 
social problem. Climate change and other environment issues are 
considered massive world problems that need “miracle” solutions 
(Gates, 2010), and belief in climate change seems to be highly 
associated with ideological beliefs (Pew Research Center, 2010). 
Many hypotheses have been put forward to explain the divide over 
climate and environmental sciences, such as differential exposure to 
media, differential trust in science, or differential fear sensitivity 
between the parties (Carraro et al., 2011; Jost et al., 2003; Oxley et al., 
2008). The solution aversion model proposed here offers an additional 
and novel perspective to this growing literature, one that we suggest 
holds important societal implications. Indeed, the small manipulations 
in our studies produced striking and dramatic effects: reducing or 
entirely erasing ideological line differences in environmental skepti- 
cism and shifting rates of agreement nearly 40%. 
The current findings also help clarify and organize past research 
on how values and fears are related to beliefs, including environ- 
mental and climate change beliefs (Feinberg & Willer, 2011, 2013; 
Feygina et al., 2010; Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010; Le- 
wandowsky,  Oberauer,  &  Gignac,  2013;  McCright  &  Dunlap, 
2011a, 2011b). For example, Schuldt et al. (2011) have observed 
that Republicans, but not Democrats, are more likely to indicate 
that they believe in climate change when it is phrased as “climate 
change” rather than “global warming.” One possible mechanism 
for this finding, given the data we have presented here, may be that 
the term global warming holds a stronger cognitive association 
with dramatic policy solutions than the more contemporary phrase 
climate change. This could be because it sounds more dire, making 
specific large-scale policy interventions feel more likely, given 
that such policy interventions have become linked to climate 
change through political rhetoric and media coverage. It is also 
possible (and potentially likely) that both fear of the problem and 
aversion to the solutions motivated skepticism. 
Or consider a study from the Pew Research Center (2010) that 
found Tea Party Republicans are much more likely to state there is no 
solid evidence that average temperatures on earth are warming than 
are Republicans who disagree with the Tea Party platform (respec- 
tively, 70% vs. 38%). Given that the Tea Party is characterized by an 
ideology that strongly prioritizes the free market and rejects govern- 
ment regulation, this finding makes good sense from a solution 
aversion perspective. Put simply, Tea Party Republicans may very 
well hold an ideology that is more acutely threatened by climate 
change solutions. The findings presented in our third study, which 
isolate the precise role of free market ideology in driving solution 
aversion effects specifically within a sample of Republicans, suggest 
this may very well be the case. 
Other research suggests interesting potential moderators for the 
findings we have presented. For example, Lewandowsky, Gignac, and 
Vaughan (2013) have noted the pivotal role of perceived scientific 
consensus in driving climate change beliefs. It is certainly possible 
that arguments that degrade perceived scientific consensus allow 
solution aversion effects to manifest. And, conversely, it is also 
possible that if perceived scientific consensus was strong enough, 
solution aversion effects would be muted. That said, it also seems 
feasible to us that solution aversion processes themselves may shape 
perceptions of scientific consensus, making the relation essentially 
bidirectional. 
Finally, our findings build upon and extend past experimental 
work that has examined the influence of psychological motivations 
on environmental behaviors and climate change beliefs (Feinberg 
& Willer, 2011, 2013; Feygina et al., 2010; Hardisty et al., 2010; 
Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, Tarantola, Silva, & Braman, 2012). A 
number of studies have examined how certain psychological mo- 
tives and needs can affect climate change science skepticism. 
Feinberg and Willer (2011), for example, observed that belief in a 
just  world  motivates  skepticism  of  climate  change,  especially 
when consequences seem dire and thus contradict the existence of 
a just world. The model and data presented here suggest that those 
high in just world belief might not only be reticent to acknowledge 
fundamental problems with the world— because, as Feinberg and 
Willer noted, doing so suggests an unjust world— but may also be 
averse to the policy solutions associated with these problems. This 
is especially so given that government regulation naturally under- 
mines the belief that people are largely responsible for their own 
actions—a core tenet of the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980). 
 
 
Limitations 
 
The most obvious limitation of this set of studies is the reliance on 
online convenience samples (i.e., Mechanical Turk). Though samples 
such as these have been shown to be as effective at capturing psy- 
chological phenomenon as are traditional convenience samples (i.e., 
student populations; Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011; Ber- 
insky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010), 
two concerns that have recently been raised with these types of 
samples are worth discussing here. First, it has been noted that, 
without the proper procedures, these samples may include an abun- 
dance of participants who either are devoting little attention or who 
have previously partaken in the same or a very similar study (Chan- 
dler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014). Though it is impossible to avoid 
some degree of these problems, we took several measures to ensure 
both that our participants were new to our experiments and that they 
paid a sufficient degree of attention. To this end, following sugges- 
tions of prior literature, participants were excluded prior to entry into 
the main survey if they had already taken an online survey on the 
topic with our lab, had failed a reading attention check, or had the 
same IP address as a prior participant (Chandler et al., 2014; Peer, 
Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2013). 
Second, it has been suggested (Kahan, 2013) that in samples such 
as these, self-identified partisan respondents (i.e., Republicans) may 
be atypical members of their political party. To the extent this is so, 
this would limit the external validity of our findings regarding specific 
cases of solution aversion. Although we acknowledge that the Re-
  
publicans and Democrats in our sample are not going to be perfectly 
representative of the larger population, the key reason we wanted to 
sample Republicans and Democrats was their differing views on the 
issues of climate change and economics. Across our studies, the 
self-identified Republicans and Democrats we sampled did appear to 
substantially differ in their views on these two key dimensions in 
ways consistent with prior representative public samples (Pew Re- 
search Center, 2010, 2012). In addition, though a goal of ours was to 
study solution aversion in an impactful context (i.e., climate change), 
our primary goal was to demonstrate the existence of this psycholog- 
ical phenomenon. 
For these reasons, we feel our samples are adequate for our 
goals. That said, there is no question that replications of our studies 
in more representative samples are important, especially if we 
hope to understand the degree to which solution aversion predicts 
actual levels of climate science denial in the general population. 
 
 
Relation to Other Theoretical Models 
 
System justification theory.    System justification (Jost & Ba- 
naji, 1994) is the tendency for people to justify, maintain, and 
otherwise bolster the validity of their current social system, often 
through motivated and fact-defying processes. Given that system 
justification tendencies can be engendered by threat (Jost, Kivetz, 
Rubini, Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005) 
and that acknowledging failures of the system that are especially 
dramatic is incompatible with the system justification motive 
(Brescoll, Uhlmann, & Newman, 2013; Napier, Mandisodza, An- 
dersen, & Jost, 2006), it is easy to imagine how climate change 
denial might relate to system justification motives. And, in fact, 
system justification motives have been shown to predict skepti- 
cism toward climate change (Feygina et al., 2010). The current 
research suggests that beyond the ways in which acknowledging 
climate change, in and of itself, is problematic from a system 
justification perspective, so too might be the solutions associated 
with climate change. This could occur for one of two reasons. 
First, to the extent people associate government intervention and 
limits on freedom as a viable solution to climate change, they are 
necessarily challenging the legitimacy of one of the most powerful 
system justifying ideologies: meritocracy (Jost et al., 2003; Major, 
1994). Many people strongly believe that government intervention 
necessarily limits meritocracy, at least in its purest form, and so 
supporting government intervention is at odds with motives that are 
satiated by supporting ideologies of meritocracy (also see Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999). Second, any radical change to government policy that is 
enacted as a solution, whatever its content, should be challenging to 
people’s system justification motive. As such, to the degree that 
climate change solutions are considered “radical” or “unprecedented,” 
they will necessarily encounter resistance, especially when motives to 
legitimize the status quo are salient (Kay & Zanna, 2009). Consistent 
with this, Feygina et al. (2010) observed that not only are system 
justification motivations predictive of skepticism toward climate 
change, but that when climate change solutions are positioned as 
system sanctioned (i.e., a means of protecting the status quo), system 
justification no longer motivates skepticism. 
Coherence.    Solution aversion may also be at least in part a 
product of people’s general tendency to seek cognitive coherence 
(Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955; Simon, 2004; Simon, Krawczyk, 
Bleicher, & Holyoak, 2008). As Simon, Snow, and Read (2004) 
explained, “Coherent representations are ones in which elements 
that are positively related to one another tend to wax and wane 
together” (p. 816). In the case of the current climate experiments, 
it would be highly incoherent to be averse to and nonsupportive of 
environmental solutions but also believe in the environmental 
problem, insofar as the belief in the problem may more or less 
imply the enactment of the specific solutions. 
Of particular relevance is recent research on moral coherence (Ditto 
& Liu, 2011). Though it might be tempting to assume that issues such 
as capital punishment (or hypothetical problems like the trolley prob- 
lem) may force people into moral dilemmas between what they know 
factually (e.g., the efficacy of using capital punishment to reduce 
crime) and what they believe deontologically (e.g., it is wrong to kill 
a defenseless person), Liu and Ditto (2013) suggest this rarely occurs. 
Instead, people usually find ways to shape their factual beliefs so that 
these are largely consistent with their moral beliefs, thus minimizing 
any psychological dilemma. For instance, participants who first ex- 
perienced a manipulation designed to alter their moral beliefs sur- 
rounding capital punishment subsequently also changed their factual 
beliefs about the efficacy of capital punishment to cohere with their 
new moral beliefs, despite not being exposed to any new factual 
information between conditions. In the case of solution aversion, a 
similar coherence-driven process may also be at work, though it might 
need to unfold in a slightly more complicated way, whereby coher- 
ence motives do not just lead people to reconstrue the efficacy of a 
solution that is misaligned with their values but also (perhaps retro- 
actively) to reconstrue the problem that originally necessitated the 
solution. 
In short, then, although the solution aversion model proposed 
and tested here offers a novel perspective, it does so in a way that 
also complements much previous theory and research. This is true, 
we believe, for both the field of motivated cognition generally and 
the important domain of climate science attitudes more specifi- 
cally. By using the political divide over climate change to test a 
novel process of motivated cognition, we have hopefully not only 
provided evidence for a novel form of motivated cognition, but 
also shed new light on why and how political ideology can lead to 
divided attitudes toward pressing social and scientific problems. 
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